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I.  INTRODUCTION 
More than one hundred thousand child sexual abuse (“CSA”) 
cases are investigated and found substantiated in the United States 
each year.1 Substantiated cases are brought to the attention of 
prosecutors who make decisions about whether to move forward 
with the case. The jurors who hear these cases may hold 
misconceptions about eyewitness testimony and child abuse2 and 
their conceptions about abuse are influenced by expert testimony.3 
Experts in these cases are often psychologists testifying either as 
 
 1. Lisa Jones & David Finkelhor, The Decline in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, JUV. 
JUST.  BULL. 1, 2 (2001). 
 2. Marcus D. Durham & Francis C. Dane, Juror Knowledge of Eyewitness 
Behavior: Evidence for the Necessity of Expert Testimony, 14 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 
299, 305 (1999); Susan Morison  & Edith Greene, Juror and Expert Knowledge of 
Child Sexual Abuse, 16 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 595, 603 (1992); Richard A. Wise & 
Martin A. Safer, What US Judges Know and Believe About Eyewitness Testimony, 18 
APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 427, 428 (2004). 
 3. Brian L. Cutler et al., Expert Testimony and Jury Decision Making: An 
Empirical Analysis, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 215, 222 (1989); Harmon M. Hosch et al., 
Influence of Expert Testimony Regarding Eyewitness Accuracy on Jury Decisions, 4 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 287, 292 (1980); Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Does Expert Psychological 
Testimony Inform or Influence Juror Decision Making? A Social Cognitive Analysis, 82 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 178, 184-85 (1997); Michael R. Leippe et al., Timing of Eyewitness 
Expert Testimony, Jurors’ Need for Cognition, and Case Strength as Determinants of Trial 
Verdicts, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 524, 531-32 (2004). But cf.  Jennifer L. Devenport & 
Brian L. Cutler, Impact of Defense-Only and Opposing Eyewitness Experts on Juror 
Judgments, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 569, 573 (2004) (discussing the impact of expert 
testimony on the credibility of psychology). 
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clinicians or scientists or both. Two reasons for dueling experts in 
psychology are the difference in standards of proof between clinical 
practice and the scientific method and the fact that psychologists 
are often asked to go beyond the data to provide opinions. A third 
reason for dueling experts is that the field of psychology and law is 
not an exact science. There are often nuances in the body of data 
that on the one hand can support the prosecution and on the 
other hand can support the defense. Thus, even assuming that 
scientists will always make the same conclusions about the same 
body of data, an untenable assumption, there are aspects of the 
body of data that are useful to both sides of a criminal case. After 
addressing each of the former issues, we spend the bulk of the 
paper addressing the latter—namely, we examine three areas of 
research on child witnesses that are commonly of concern in CSA 
cases and discuss how aspects of the data support both the defense 
and the prosecution. We focus on (1) children’s memory, (2) 
children’s suggestibility, and (3) diagnosing abuse. We have chosen 
only three common child witness issues for the purposes of this 
review, and readers who are interested in a more thorough 
treatment of child witness issues in their full breadth and depth are 
referred to a number of excellent overviews of the field.4 
II.   BACKGROUND ON CHILD WITNESSES 
A. When Do Children Testify? 
Most children who testify in criminal court are doing so about 
alleged activities perpetrated on themselves, and in particular, they 
are testifying about alleged sexual abuse. The primary reason that 
 
 4. See, e.g., STEPHEN J. CECI & MAGGIE BRUCK, JEOPARDY IN THE COURTROOM: A 
SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY (1995); CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD 
WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING TESTIMONY (Gail S. Goodman & Bette 
L. Bottoms eds., 1993); CHILDREN AND THE LAW: THE ESSENTIAL READINGS (Ray Bull 
ed., 2001); CHILDREN AS WITNESSES (Helen Dent & Rhona Flin eds., 1992); 
CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY: A HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND FORENSIC 
PRACTICE (Helen L. Westcott et al. eds., 2002); EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE 
CASES: WHAT CAN AND SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT (Stephen J. Ceci & Helen 
Hembrooke eds., 1998); INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE AND 
CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY (Bette L. Bottoms & Gail S. Goodman eds., 1996); LUCY S. 
MCGOUGH, CHILD WITNESSES: FRAGILE VOICES IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 
(1994); MEMORY AND TESTIMONY IN THE CHILD WITNESS (Maria S. Zaragoza et al. 
eds., 1995); DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF 
CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS (1998). 
3
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this is the case is not because children fail to witness other crimes, 
but because they are simply not ideal witnesses. Additionally, the 
process of investigative interviewing may, for some children, be 
perceived as an extra stressor. We touch on reasons why children 
may or may not be effective witnesses in later sections of this 
paper,5 but in general, child witnesses are called to testify as a last 
resort. In other types of crimes (e.g., theft or assault), other 
witnesses or other types of evidence are likely to be present and are 
generally preferable types of evidence to statements made by young 
children. Even in allegations of child physical abuse, the children’s 
bodies can be used as corroboration of their reports, but in sexual 
abuse cases, medical corroboration or other witnesses are generally 
not available. Thus, when we speak of child witnesses we are most 
commonly addressing concerns relevant to child sexual assault 
cases. 
B.  What Lay People Know About Child Abuse and the Influence of 
Experts 
Jurors have a reasonably accurate perspective about many 
areas of eyewitness research, but jurors,6 and even judges,7 have 
misconceptions about a number of witness issues, including 
misconceptions about child sexual abuse.8 For example, both jurors 
and judges believe that eyewitness confidence is related to 
accuracy,9 which is often not the case.10 Jurors rely too heavily on 
minute details and underestimate the importance of effective 
indicators of eyewitness accuracy, such as how long the witness was 
able to view the perpetrator (e.g., whether the perpetrator was 
wearing a disguise) and what other perceptual conditions were 
present (e.g., was it light enough to realistically observe a detailed 
face?). Jurors often lack knowledge about factors that interfere with 
accurate retention, such as the impact of stress on perception and 
 
 5. See infra Part III. 
 6. Durham & Dane, supra note 2, at 305. 
 7. Wise & Safer, supra note 2, at 433. 
 8. Morison & Greene, supra note 2, at 607. 
 9. George L. Rahaim & Stanley L. Brodsky, Empirical Evidence Versus Common 
Sense: Juror and Lawyer Knowledge of Eyewitness Accuracy, 7 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1, 11 
(1982); Wise & Safer, supra note 2, at 432-33. 
 10. Rahaim & Brodsky, supra note 9, at 11; Gary L. Wells et al., The Confidence 
of Eyewitnesses in Their Identifications from Lineups, 11 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 151, 151-52 (2002). 
4
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memory,11 and are insensitive to biases that are introduced during a 
criminal investigation.12 
In addition to misconceptions about eyewitnesses generally, 
jurors have stereotypes about child witnesses and sexual assault that 
affect their deliberations. The findings on jurors’ age-related 
stereotypes are mixed. In this context, an age-related stereotype is 
an expectation about what a child of a particular age is capable of 
remembering, saying, etc. Some studies have found that child 
witnesses are perceived as more credible than adults while still 
others have found that child witnesses are perceived as less credible 
than adults.13 Beyond general beliefs about child witnesses’ abilities, 
effects of jurors’ own gender on their perceptions of child witnesses 
are ubiquitous. Researchers have found that women are more 
conviction prone in sexual assault cases,14 believe children more 
than men,15 find children more credible,16 and are more likely to 
 
 11. See, e.g., Sven-Ake Christianson, Emotional Stress and Eyewitness Memory: A 
Critical Review, 112 PSYCHOL. BULL. 284 (1992) (examining the effect of emotional 
stress on memory and concluding that the conventional literature oversimplifies 
the issue). 
 12. Durham & Dane, supra note 2, at 305. 
 13. Bette L. Bottoms & Gail S. Goodman, Perceptions of Children’s Credibility in 
Sexual Assault Cases, 24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 702, 724 (1994) (concluding that 
mock jurors found child sexual assault victims equally credible or more credible 
than older victims); Natalie J. Gabora et al., The Effects of Complainant Age and Expert 
Psychological Testimony in a Simulated Child Sexual Abuse Trial, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
103, 115 (1993) (finding that mock jurors returned guilty verdicts after 
deliberations significantly more often when they viewed a younger complainant 
than when they viewed an older complainant); Michael R. Leippe & Ann 
Romanczyk, Reactions to Child (Versus Adult) Eyewitnesses: The Influence of Jurors’ 
Preconceptions and Witness Behavior, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 103, 127 (1989) 
(comparing five studies and concluding that eyewitness age mattered but that “the 
direction of the difference varied across the studies”); Annika Melinder et al., 
Beliefs About Child Witnesses: A Survey of Professionals, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 347, 
361-62 (2004) (finding that Norwegian defense attorneys and psychologists 
maintained skepticism regarding children’s credibility); Narina Nunez 
Nightingale, Juror Reactions to Child Victim Witnesses, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 679, 692 
(1993) (discussing why results show older children as less credible); David F. Ross 
et al., The Child in the Eyes of the Jury: Assessing Mock Jurors’ Perceptions of the Child 
Witness, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 17-18 (1990) (finding jurors viewed a child 
witness more favorably than a young adult witness, contrasting previously 
published research). 
 14. Gabora et al., supra note 13, at 116-17; Michelle R. McCauley & Janat 
Fraser Parker, When Will a Child Be Believed? The Impact of the Victim’s Age and Juror’s 
Gender on Children’s Credibility and Verdict in a Sexual-Abuse Case, 25 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 523, 535 (2001); Jodi A. Quas et al., Effects of Victim, Defendant, and Juror 
Gender on Decisions in Child Sexual Assault Cases, 32 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1993, 
2009-10 (2002). 
 15. Bottoms & Goodman, supra note 13, at 725; Bette L. Bottoms et al., Jurors’ 
5
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recommend that the defendant serve the entire sentence.17 Finally, 
case characteristics also affect jurors’ perceptions about child 
witnesses, with some evidence that children are viewed as more 
credible in civil cases than criminal cases18 and in sexual assault 
cases than in robbery cases.19  
In many studies, expert testimony has been found to have 
some effect on jurors’ perceptions and verdicts. Many studies find 
an effect of expert testimony on jurors’ judgments in mock cases,20 
with some studies finding a limited effect on jurors,21 an effect on 
only some jurors,22 or occasionally no effect of experts.23 
C. Scientific Expert Testimony—Non-Scientific Expert Testimony 
Do jurors understand the difference between scientific 
testimony and non-scientific testimony? Do they weigh and use the 
testimony differently? Both scientific and non-scientific opinions 
are allowed in the courts, and different standards may be used to 
judge each.24 Non-scientific evidence is based on anecdotal 
experience and in many cases is very useful in deliberations. 
However, if there are data on the topic being discussed, it seems 
clear that the empirical evidence is preferable to anecdotal 
experience. If an expert testifies based on his or her experience, 
and there is empirical evidence that directly contradicts the 
experience of the expert or at least qualifies his or her statements, 
the opposing side may not know that that contradictory empirical 
 
Perceptions of Adolescent Sexual Assault Victims Who Have Intellectual Disabilities, 27 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 205, 209 (2003) (finding that women “have more pro[-]victim 
perceptions” of child and adolescent sexual abuse victims); Gabora et al., supra 
note 13, at 116. 
 16. McCauley & Parker, supra note 14, at 535. 
 17. V. Anne Tubb et al., Effects of Suggestive Interviewing and Indirect Evidence on 
Child Credibility in a Sexual Abuse Case, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1111, 1121 
(1999). 
 18. Nightingale, supra note 13, at 687. 
 19. McCauley & Parker, supra note 14, at 536. 
 20. Cutler et al., supra note 3, at 222-23; Hosch et al., supra note 3, at 292; 
Kovera et al., supra note 3, at 184; Leippe et al., supra note 3, at 531. 
 21. Harmon M. Hosch, A Comparison of Three Studies of the Influence of Expert 
Testimony on Jurors, 4 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 297, 300-01 (1980). 
 22. Robert A. Schuller et al., Rethinking Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence: The 
Impact of Alternative Forms of Expert Testimony on Mock Jurors’ Decisions, 36 CANADIAN J. 
BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 127, 134 (2004). 
 23. Devenport & Cutler, supra note 3, at 574. 
 24. BRUCE D. SALES & DANIEL W. SHUMAN, EXPERTS IN COURT: RECONCILING 
LAW, SCIENCE, AND PROFESSIONAL KNOWLEDGE 34, 39 (2005). 
6
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evidence exists. In this case, the ability of the other side to 
recognize when an opposing expert should be hired is the only 
legal safeguard for anecdotal evidence being given when 
conflicting empirical evidence exists. There is some evidence to 
suggest that jurors weight anecdotal, non-scientific testimony with 
more strength than scientific testimony.25 Further, among scientific 
experts, jurors give more weight to expert testimony that goes 
beyond describing the scientific studies to tie those studies to the 
case at hand.26 
We bring up these issues not because there are answers but 
because they are part of the reason why the court may see vastly 
different opinions between two psychological experts—particularly 
if one expert is testifying based on his or her experiences and one 
expert is testifying based on his or her knowledge of the scientific 
literature. 
III.  THREE AREAS OF CHILD WITNESS RESEARCH 
A. Children’s Memory 
1. What the Prosecution Should Know 
Young children are capable of accurately recalling 
autobiographical events over relatively long time periods. There are 
numerous studies that highlight the strengths of young children’s 
memories when asked neutral questions, including after longer 
delays, and suggest that by age 2.5, children are capable of long-
lasting memories of salient events.27 Even in the suggestibility 
 
 25. Brian H. Bornstein, The Impact of Different Types of Expert Scientific Testimony 
on Mock Jurors’ Liability Verdicts, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 429, 435 (2004); Daniel A. 
Krauss et al., The Effects of Rational and Experiential Information Processing of Expert 
Testimony in Death Penalty Cases, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 801, 814 (2004). But see Laura 
S. Guy & John F. Edens, Juror Decision-making in a Mock Sexually Violent Predator 
Trial: Gender Differences in the Impact of Divergent Types of Expert Testimony, 21 BEHAV. 
SCI. & L. 215 (2003) (illustrating an exception). 
 26. R. Edward Geiselman, et al., Eyewitness Expert Testimony and Juror Decisions, 
20(3) AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 21, 25 (2002); James D. Griffith, et al., The Effects of 
Expert Testimony on Mock Jurors’ Decision Making and Memory, 20(2) AM. J. FORENSIC 
PSYCHOL. 69, 77 (2002). 
 27. See, e.g., Robyn Fivush, Children’s Recollections of Traumatic and Nontraumatic 
Events, 10 DEV. & PSYCHOPATHOLOGY 699 (1998); Robyn Fivush et al., Content and 
Consistency in Young Children’s Autobiographical Recall, 14 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 373 
(1991); Robyn Fivush & April Schwarzmueller, Say It Once Again: Effects of Repeated 
7
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literature, most studies report that children in the control group 
(i.e., no suggestion) recall events with high rates of accuracy.28 
Evidence from both sets of data indicates that in the absence of 
suggestion even very young preschoolers can provide highly 
accurate reports. 
In addition, recent reviews of the literature of emotional 
memory and memory for traumatic experiences indicate that 
children remember and recall such highly stressful events as well as 
they recall neutral events.29 Indeed, studies with both adults and 
children reveal that emotional, negative information tends to be 
remembered better than positive or neutral information.30 
Moreover, even at very young ages, children’s accounts of negative 
personal experiences are detailed. In one study, two-year-old 
children were able to provide coherent and detailed recollections 
of traumatic injuries and ensuing emergency room treatments that 
they had experienced several days previously.31 The children’s 
recall of the central details of the target events was still robust when 
tested six and twelve months later. 
 
Questions on Children’s Event Recall, 8 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 555 (1995); Robyn Fivush 
et al., Structure and Coherence of Preschoolers’ Personal Narratives Over Time: Implications 
for Childhood Amnesia, 60 J.  EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 32 (1995); Robyn Fivush 
& Nina R. Hamond, Time and Again: Effects of Repetition and Retention Interval on 2 
Year Olds’ Event Recall, 47 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 259 (1989); Gail S. 
Goodman et al., Nearly 4 Years After an Event: Children’s Eyewitness Memory and Adults’ 
Perceptions of Children’s Accuracy, 26 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 849 (2002); Irit 
Hershkowitz, Children’s Responses to Open-ended Utterances in Investigative Interviews, 6 
LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 49 (2001); Irit Hershkowitz et al., The 
Relationships Among Interviewer Utterance Type, CBCA Scores and the Richness of 
Children’s Responses, 2 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 169 (1997); Carole 
Peterson et al., Providing Misleading and Reinstatement Information a Year After It 
Happened: Effects on Long-term Memory, 12 MEMORY 1 (2004); Debra A. Poole & 
Lawrence T. White, Effects of Question Repetition on the Eyewitness Testimony of Children 
and Adults, 27 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 975 (1991). 
 28. See, e.g., Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of Stereotypes 
and Suggestions on Preschoolers’ Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568, 571 
(1995). 
 29. Ingrid M. Cordon, et al., Memory for Traumatic Experiences in Early 
Childhood, 24 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 101, 122 (2004). 
 30. See, e.g., Dorthe Berntsen, Involuntary Memories of Emotional Events: Do 
Memories of Traumas and Extremely Happy Events Differ?, 15 APPLIED COGNITIVE 
PSYCHOL. 135 (2001); Gail S. Goodman et al., Children’s Memory for Stressful Events, 
37 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 109 (1991). 
 31. Mark L. Howe et al., How Can I Remember When “I” Wasn’t There: Long-term 
Retention of Traumatic Memories and Emergence of the Cognitive Self, 3 CONSCIOUSNESS & 
COGNITION 327, 338 (1994). 
8
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/7
3GILSTRAP_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  9:47:26 AM 
2005] CHILD WITNESSES: COMMON GROUND 67 
2. What the Defense Should Know 
It is a common finding in memory research that younger 
children provide fewer details than older children in the context of 
neutral interviews.32 In addition, although children are generally 
accurate when they are interviewed by a neutral experimenter who 
asks few leading questions, and when they are not given any 
motivation to produce distorted reports, there is occasionally a very 
small percentage of children who give bizarre or sexualized answers 
to direct questions. For example, in a study of children’s reports of 
medical examinations, one child, who had not received a genital 
exam, falsely reported that the pediatrician had touched her 
buttocks and on further questioning claimed that it tickled and 
that the doctor used a long stick.33 Thus, young children may 
occasionally make spontaneous, bizarre, and unfounded 
allegations, and there are currently not any methods for predicting 
which children will do so. 
3. What the Whole Truth Is 
In neutral interviews, very young children (i.e., as young as 
2.5) have been shown to be capable in some circumstances of 
providing relatively accurate reports of past events over relatively 
long time periods. These reports are less detailed on average than 
reports provided by older children and adults. However, these free 
recall reports, while relatively accurate, are not free from minor 
errors, and, furthermore, in relatively neutral direct questioning, a 
very small percentage of children will provide inaccurate details 
even about bodily touch. 
There is a large amount of literature examining the effects of 
stress on the accuracy and completeness of memory that suggests 
moderate stress generally fails to hinder memory and may facilitate 
memory.34 
 
 32. Michael E. Lamb et al., Age Differences in Young Children’s Responses to Open-
Ended Invitations in the Course of Forensic Interviews, 71 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 926, 929 (2003); Poole & White, supra note 27, at 978. But see 
Hershkowitzs, supra note 27, at 173 (opposing results, in which older children 
used more words, but not more details, in their responses). 
 33. Karen J. Saywitz et al., Children’s Memories of a Physical Examination 
Involving Genital Touch: Implications for Reports of Child Sexual Abuse, 59 J. 
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 682, 687 (1991). 
 34. For review, see Kathy Pezdek & Jennifer Taylor, Memories of Traumatic 
Events in Children and Adults, in MEMORY AND SUGGESTIBILITY IN THE FORENSIC 
INTERVIEW 165-83 (Mitchell Eisen et al. eds., 2001). 
9
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B. Children’s Suggestibility 
1.  What the Defense Should Know 
Young children’s reports of past events are susceptible to 
distortion via adults’ suggestions.35 This susceptibility is called 
“suggestibility” and can be defined as the degree to which the 
encoding, storage, retrieval, and reporting of events can be 
influenced by a range of internal and external factors that can be 
present before or after the event. Factors such as question 
repetition,36 yes/no questions,37 misleading questions,38 repeated 
interviewing,39 plausible suggestions,40 stereotyping,41 anatomical 
 
 35. See, e.g., DEBRA A. POOLE & MICHAEL E. LAMB, INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWS OF 
CHILDREN: A GUIDE FOR HELPING PROFESSIONALS 48-49 (1998); Stephen J. Ceci & 
Maggie Bruck, Suggestibility of the Child Witness: A Historical Review and Synthesis, 113 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 403 (1993); Stephen J. Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The 
Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 
33 (2000); Thomas D. Lyon, The New Wave in Children’s Suggestibility Research: A 
Critique, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1004 (1999); Jodi A. Quas et al., Questioning the Child 
Witness: What Can We Conclude From the Research Thus Far? 1 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & 
ABUSE 223 (2000). 
 36. Debra Ann Poole & Lawrence T. White, Two Years Later: Effects of Question 
Repetition and Retention Interval on the Eyewitness Testimony of Children and Adults, 29 
DEV. PSYCHOL. 844, 851 (1993); Poole & White, supra note 27, at 983-84. 
 37. Michael S. Brady et al., Young Children’s Responses to Yes-No Questions: 
Patterns and Problems, 3 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 47, 52-53 (1999); V. Heather Fritzley & 
Kang Lee, Do Young Children Always Say Yes to Yes-No Questions? A Metadevelopmental 
Study of the Affirmation Bias, 74 CHILD DEV. 1297, 1307-08 (2003). 
 38. Ceci & Bruck, supra note 35, at 432. See also Gail S. Goodman & Jennifer 
M. Schaaf, Over a Decade of Research on Children’s Eyewitness Testimony: What Have We 
Learned? Where Do We Go From Here? 11 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. S5 (1997) 
(“[I]nterviews should not be judged dichotomously as either leading or non-
leading, but rather viewed as falling along a ‘leadingness continuum.’”); Elizabeth 
F. Loftus, Leading Questions and the Eyewitness Report, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 560 
(1975) (suggesting “that questions asked immediately after an event can introduce 
new--not necessarily correct--information, which is then added to the memorial 
representation of the event, thereby causing its reconstruction or alteration”); 
Claudia M. Roebers & Wolfgang Schneider, The Impact of Misleading Questions on 
Eyewitness Memory in Children and Adults, 14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 509 (2000) 
(“How suggestibility is assessed is . . . also important and children’s responses to 
misleading questions may not reflect their memory for the original event.”). 
 39. Debra A. Poole & Lawrence T. White, Tell Me Again and Again: Stability and 
Change in the Repeated Testimonies of Children and Adults, in 1 MEMORY AND TESTIMONY 
IN THE CHILD WITNESS 24-43 (Maria S. Zaragoza et al. eds., 1995). 
 40. Kathy Pezdek et al., Planting False Childhood Memories: The Role of Event 
Plausibility, 8 PSYCHOL. SCI. 437, 440 (1997). 
 41. Michelle D. Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of Stereotypes and 
Suggestions on Preschoolers’ Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568, 573 (1995). 
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dolls,42 and invocation of peer conformity43  have been associated 
with errors in children’s reports to adult interviewers. When several 
of these factors are combined, rates of acceptance of suggested 
information can be very high.44 Younger children are generally 
more vulnerable to the deleterious effects of an interviewer’s 
misleading suggestions than older children,45 and some children 
will persist in their false beliefs despite challenges.46 Moreover, 
some children will misreport painful events,47 and even genital, 
anal, or other abuse-relevant touch.48 Examples of abuse-relevant 
false statements range from claiming a strange man “put something 
 
 42. Mark D. Everson & Barbara W. Boat, The Utility of Anatomical Dolls and 
Drawings in Child Forensic Interviews, in MEMORY AND SUGGESTIBILITY IN THE FORENSIC 
INTERVIEW 383-408 (Mitchell L. Eisen et al., eds., 2002). See generally Maggie Bruck 
et al., External and Internal Sources of Variation in the Creation of False Reports in 
Children, 9 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 289 (1997) (reviewing the 
correlation between the use of anatomical dolls and the errors in children’s 
reports to adult interviewers). 
 43. Matthew H. Scullin et al., Measurement of Individual Differences in Children’s 
Suggestibility Across Situations, 8 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 233, 243 (2002). 
 44. Sena Garven et al., Allegations of Wrongdoing: The Effects of Reinforcement on 
Children’s Mundane and Fantastic Claims, 85 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 38, 43 (2000); Sena 
Garven et al., More Than Suggestion: The Effect of Interviewing Techniques from the 
McMartin Preschool Case, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 354 (1998). 
 45. Ceci & Friedman, supra note 35, at 56-57. 
 46. Leichtman & Ceci, supra note 41, at 571. 
 47. Peter A. Ornstein et al., Young Children’s Long-Term Retention of Medical 
Experiences: Implications for Testimony, in MEMORY PERFORMANCE AND COMPETENCIES: 
ISSUES IN GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT 349-71 (Franz E. Weiner & Wolfgang 
Schneider eds., 1995); Maggie Bruck et al., “I Hardly Cried When I Got My Shot!”: 
Influencing Children’s Reports About a Visit to Their Pediatrician, 66 CHILD DEV. 193, 
202 (1995). 
 48. Mitchell L. Eisen et al., Memory and Suggestibility in Maltreated Children: New 
Research Relevant to Evaluating Allegations of Abuse, in TRUTH IN MEMORY 163, 179-80 
(Steven Jay Lynn & Kevin M. McConkey eds., 1998); Gail S. Goodman & Alison 
Clarke-Stewart, Suggestibility in Children’s Testimony: Implications for Sexual Abuse 
Investigations, in THE SUGGESTIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S RECOLLECTIONS 92, 102-05 
(John Doris ed., 1991); Maggie Bruck et al., Anatomically Detailed Dolls Do Not 
Facilitate Preschoolers’ Reports of a Pediatric Examination Involving Genital Touching, 1 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 95, 101-03 (1995); Gail S. Goodman et al., 
Children’s Reactions to and Memory for a Stressful Event: Influences of Age, Anatomical 
Dolls, Knowledge, and Parental Attachment, 1 APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. 54, 70 
(1997); Leslie Rudy & Gail S. Goodman, Effects of Participation on Children’s Reports: 
Implications for Children’s Testimony, 27 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 527, 533 (1991); 
Karen J. Saywitz et al., Children’s Memories of a Physical Examination Involving Genital 
Touch: Implications for Reports of Child Sexual Abuse, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL 
PSYCHOL. 682, 685-87 (1991); Margaret S. Steward et al., Interviewing Young Children 
About Body Touch and Handling, 61 MONOGRAPHS OF THE SOC’Y FOR RES. IN CHILD 
DEV. 1, 114 (1996). 
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yucky into their mouths” during a visit to a science exhibit49 to 
claiming that someone took off their clothes and kissed them50 or 
inserted objects in their anogenital cavities.51 
2.  What the Prosecution Should Know 
Many children do not succumb to suggestion, and which 
children will or will not succumb to suggestion cannot currently be 
identified. The suggestibility studies described above also 
demonstrate that some children are quite resistant to all of the 
suggestive factors listed above. Although we have done a great deal 
of work in the area of individual differences in children’s 
suggestibility,52 we have not been successful at identifying who these 
children are, at least not with any confidence. In the majority of the 
studies cited above, fewer than 50% of children made false reports. 
Hence, when social science research is introduced in court, it 
needs to be accompanied with the caveat that not all children are 
equally vulnerable to suggestive influence and we have no sound 
and sure method of knowing whether the children involved in the 
particular case at hand are the rule or the exception.53 
Even though some children will falsely report genital and anal 
touch, children appear to be less susceptible to suggestions about 
these topics.54 Further, most of the research cited above involved 
multiple suggestive factors, multiple interviews, repeated suggestive 
questions, and sometimes all of these. The effect of a single leading 
question in an otherwise neutral interview is not clear. In addition, 
as discussed in the section on children’s memory, unless suggestion 
is present, most young children are relatively accurate in their 
 
 49. Debra A. Poole & D. Stephen Lindsay, Interviewing Preschoolers: Effects of 
Nonsuggestive Techniques, Parental Coaching, and Leading Questions on Reports of 
Nonexperienced Events, 60 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 129, 143 (1995). 
 50. Stephen J. Lepore & Barbara Sesco, Distorting Children’s Reports and 
Interpretations of Events Through Suggestion, 79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 108, 112 (1994). 
 51. Bruck et al., supra note 48, at 102. 
 52. See generally Jodi A. Quas et al., Emotion and Memory: Children’s Long-Term 
Remembering, Forgetting, and Suggestibility, 72 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 235, 
239-40 (1999); Jodi A. Quas et al., Individual Differences in Children’s and Adults’ 
Suggestibility and False Event Memory, 9 LEARNING & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 359 
(1997); Scullin et al., supra note 43. 
 53. See generally EXPERT WITNESSES IN CHILD ABUSE CASES: WHAT CAN AND 
SHOULD BE SAID IN COURT, supra note 4. 
 54. Rudy & Goodman, supra note 48, at 533; Saywitz et al., supra note 48, at 
688-89; Steward et al., supra note 48, at 113-14. 
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reports of salient life events.55 
In general, it is more difficult to implant false memories for 
implausible events than plausible events,56 to change details for 
central events than peripheral events,57 and to implant memories of 
more salient (e.g., bodily touch) events rather less salient events.58 
Finally, although some studies come close, none of the studies 
cited has attempted to implant completely false memories about an 
entire sexual abuse event in children. This would clearly be 
unethical and this type of study is not anticipated. 
3.  What the Whole Truth Is 
Researchers have not currently found boundary conditions on 
the upper or lower end of suggestibility. The issue of interviewing 
techniques and suggestibility is a balance between omission and 
commission errors. Certain interviewing techniques, such as direct 
questions, increase commission errors (i.e., suggestibility—when a 
child assents to something that did not happen) but also reduce 
omission errors (i.e., when a child who experienced something fails 
to report it). However, more neutral techniques, such as free recall, 
while they may decrease commission errors, also appear to result in 
increased omission errors. 
The relationship between external pressure and children’s 
suggestibility appears to be continuous with more pressure related 
to more suggestibility and less pressure related to less suggestibility. 
However, some children will still make false reports, even for bodily 
touch, in relatively neutral interviews, and some children will still 
make correct reports about bodily touch (i.e., correctly denying if 
they did not experience the event) even under highly suggestive 
conditions. Still, boundary conditions might exist and researchers 
are, rightfully, constrained in what studies they will conduct by 
ethics. For example, researchers have not systematically tried to 
 
 55. See supra Part III.A. 
 56. Giuliana A. L. Mazzoni et al., Changing Beliefs About Implausible 
Autobiographical Events: A Little Plausibility Goes a Long Way, 7 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: APPLIED 51, 58 (2001); Kathy Pezdek & Danelle Hodge, Planting False 
Childhood Memories in Children: The Role of Event Plausibility, 70 CHILD DEV. 887, 893 
(1999). 
 57. Camilla Gobbo, Assessing the Effects of Misinformation on Children’s Recall: 
How and When Makes a Difference, 14 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 163, 169 (2000). 
 58. Jodi A. Quas & Jennifer M. Schaaf, Children’s Memories of Experienced and 
Nonexperienced Events Following Repeated Interviews, 83 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD 
PSYCHOL. 304, 320-21 (2002). 
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implant memories of false sexual abuse in children using pressure 
from parents and presumably never will. 
C.  Diagnosing Abuse 
The title of this section reflects a belief of many jurors, 
attorneys, judges, and clinicians that mental health professionals 
can diagnose abuse. By diagnose abuse, we mean the ability to 
determine whether individual children have been abused.59 We 
separate this section into clinicians’ ability to detect abuse, to 
predict abuse status from behaviors, and to detect false reports. 
1. What the Prosecution Wants to Hear 
Clinicians’ ability to detect abuse: Mental health professionals 
have structured assessment tools based on clinical experience and 
on rates of behaviors occurring in abused and non-abused children 
that major mental health organizations have published to aid in the 
assessment of children and adolescents where abuse is suspected.60 
In addition to guidelines published by mental health organizations, 
there are numerous forensic evaluation tools that have been 
published in peer review journals.61 There is fairly widespread use 
of these tools in the forensic evaluation community. 
Predicting abuse status from behaviors: There are studies showing 
 
 59. Clearly, clinicians are trained in diagnosis, but in the diagnosis of 
disorders based on current symptoms and the patient’s history, not in the 
diagnosis of past events based on current symptoms. The therapist may believe 
that abuse happened because the patient reports abuse, but this reflects the need 
of the therapist to work with the information available rather than a special ability 
to detect abuse from symptoms. 
 60. See, e.g., William Bernet et al., Practice Parameters for the Forensic Evaluation of 
Children and Adolescents Who May Have Been Physically or Sexually Abused, 36 J. AM. 
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 37S (Supp. 1997). 
 61. See, e.g., Richard A. Gardner, Clinical Evaluation of Alleged Child Sex Abuse in 
Custody Disputes, in 7 INNOVATIONS IN CLINICAL PRACTICE: A SOURCE BOOK 61-76 
(Peter A. Keller & Steven R. Heyman eds., 1988); JONATHAN W. GOULD, 
CONDUCTING SCIENTIFICALLY CRAFTED CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 196-217 (Jim 
Nageotte et al. eds., 1998); Richard A. Gardner, Interview Criteria for Assessing 
Allegations of Sexual Abuse in Children and Adults, 31 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHOANALYSIS & 
DYNAMIC PSYCHIATRY 297 (2003); Richard A. Gardner, Differentiating Between True 
and False Sex-Abuse Accusations in Child-Custody Disputes, 21 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 
1 (1994); Dennis M. Harrison, Guidelines for the Use of Videotape in the Validation of 
Child Sex Abuse, 3 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 18 (1987); Alan J. Klein, Forensic Issues 
in Sexual Abuse Allegations in Custody/Visitation Litigation, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 
247 (1994). 
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 1 [2005], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol32/iss1/7
3GILSTRAP_PAGINATED.DOC 11/17/2005  9:47:26 AM 
2005] CHILD WITNESSES: COMMON GROUND 73 
that abused children are more likely to show certain behaviors62 
than non-abused children.63 
Detecting false reports: There is some evidence that adults can 
detect children who are lying by using a combination of their 
nonverbal cues and utilizing checklists to analyze their statements.64 
2.  What the Defense Wants to Hear 
Clinicians’ ability to detect abuse: The use of clinical experience to 
diagnose abuse is beyond the ability of mental health professions. 
Clinicians are trained to diagnose current disorders from current 
and historical symptoms. Even when a diagnosis of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) from abuse is made, the portion of the 
diagnosis that is “from abuse” is based on the report of the child or 
the parent, not any special skills of the clinician. In fact, there is 
evidence that mental health professionals are not able to identify 
abused children from known populations65 or identify false 
memories when they are known66 and differ widely from each other 
in their estimates of the likelihood of abuse in a single case.67 In 
addition, the forensic evaluations that rely on children’s behaviors 
are not scientifically valid because of diverse symptomology.68 In 
their manual, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent 
Psychiatry (AACAP) clearly states that symptomology is not 
diagnostic: 
 
 62. E.g., sexualized play. 
 63. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Kendall-Tackett et al., Impact of Sexual Abuse on 
Children: A Review and Synthesis of Recent Empirical Studies, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 164 
(1993) (reviewing studies that demonstrated that sexually abused children had 
more symptoms than non-abused children); Roland C. Summit, The Child Sexual 
Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983) (discussing 
the reactions and effects of child abuse accommodation syndrome). 
 64. Aldert Vrij et al., Detecting Deceit Via Analyses of Verbal and Nonverbal 
Behavior in Children and Adults, 30 HUM. COMM. RES. 8, 30-31 (2004). 
 65. Marc A. Lindberg et al., Comparisons of Three Different Investigative Interview 
Techniques with Young Children, 164 J. GENETIC PSYCHOL. 5, 18 (2003). 
 66. Stephen J. Ceci & Mary Lyn C. Huffman, How Suggestible Are Preschool 
Children? Cognitive and Social Factors, 36 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT 
PSYCHIATRY 948, 957 (1997). 
 67. Thomas M. Horner et al., The Biases of Child Sexual Abuse Experts: Believing 
Is Seeing, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 281, 287-89 (1993); Thomas M. 
Horner et al., Clinical Expertise and the Assessment of Child Sexual Abuse, 32 J. AM. 
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 925, 928 (1993). 
 68. Margaret A. Hagen, Faith in the Model and Resistance to Research, 10 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC. 344, 344 (2003); Kendall-Tackett et al., supra note 
63, at 173. 
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Abused children manifest diverse symptoms, a variety of 
emotional, behavioral, and somatic reactions. These 
symptoms are neither specific nor pathognomonic, in that 
the same symptoms may occur without any history of 
abuse. The symptoms manifested by abused children can 
be organized into clinical patterns. Although it may be 
helpful to note whether a particular case falls into one of 
these patterns, that is not in itself diagnostic of child 
abuse. The following studies are often cited as examples 
of clinical patterns associated with abuse. Since this is an 
evolving and developing area, these studies are not 
definitive. In general, the research on child maltreatment 
has been limited because of the wide variance in 
definitions of abuse and because of the absence of 
adequate control groups.69 
 
The AACAP goes beyond this to warn clinicians that their 
manual is primarily based on current consensus, not science: 
 
The recommendations regarding specific diagnostic 
evaluations and treatment interventions reflect those 
methods of practice, which are either supported by 
methodologically sound empirical studies and/or are 
considered a standard of care by competent clinicians. 
However, the general paucity of sound scientific data regarding 
childhood psychiatry disorders and their treatment necessitated 
that most of the recommendations set forth in these parameters 
were based on clinical consensus. Those practices that are 
described as having limited or no research data and also 
lack of clinical consensus regarding their efficacy may still 
be used in some selected cases, but the clinician should be 
aware of the limitations and document the rationale for 
their use.70 
 
Although many of these tools have been published in peer 
reviewed journals, their use and publication emphasize the need 
for courts to recognize that peer reviewed journal publication does 
 
 69. William Bernet et al., Practice Parameters for the Forensic Evaluation of 
Children and Adolescents Who May Have Been Physically or Sexually Abused, 36 J. AM. 
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 423 (1997) (no page numbers in original). 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
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not necessarily indicate the presence of empirical validation. 
Finally, we agree that consensus may be the best available tool 
when scientific data are not available. However, a number of 
studies have shown that clinical forensic evaluation tools are not 
diagnostic and have high error rates.71 Thus, it is not the case that 
the forensic evaluations have not been empirically studied and no 
data exist to support or argue against their use. Instead, a number 
of these techniques have been shown to lack validity. 
Predicting abuse status from behaviors: Postdiction72 has no basis in 
the scientific community and indeed involves a basic error in 
logic.73 Further, the data on symptomology of abused and non-
abused children are too variable to use to postdict abuse status. 
Many non-abused children will exhibit a given symptom and many 
abused children will not. In hypothetical scenarios, even high rates 
of a behavior in abused children and low rates in non-abused 
children are likely to result in worse than chance predictions of 
abuse status, even when using multiple behaviors.74 
 
 71. See, e.g., Kerry M. Drach et al., The Diagnostic Utility of Sexual Behavior 
Problems in Diagnosing Sexual Abuse in a Forensic Child Abuse Evaluation Clinic, 25 
CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 489 (2001) (suggesting that medical professionals should 
use caution in relying on sexual behavior problems as a diagnostic indicator of 
abuse); Steve Herman, Improving Decision Making in Forensic Child Sexual Abuse 
Evaluations, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 87 (2005) (examining the current lack of 
adequate psychometric reliability and validity in clinical forensic tools). 
 72. I.e., making a probabilistic statement about the likelihood of abuse based 
on current symptoms. 
 73. Those who have studied logic will be familiar with the error of affirming 
the antecedent. In logical terms, this is when we know that P leads to Q (P Q), 
we know that Q is present, and then we make the error of concluding that the 
presence of Q means that P is true (Q P). In a child abuse case, this would be the 
same as saying if abuse (P) leads to sexual play (Q), and a child engages in sexual 
play (Q), then we can conclude that the child has been abused (P). This is a 
logical error because other events could lead to Q besides P. For example, Z Q 
or X Q. In our example, other events could lead to child sexual play such as 
discussing sex with an older sibling, curiosity, or coming into contact with sexual 
material. Because other events could lead to sexual play, we cannot conclude that 
abuse occurred because sexual play is present. 
 74. There is an imperfect, probabilistic relationship between any symptom 
and abuse. Some abused children will not display the symptom and some non-
abused children will display the symptom. In theory this probabilistic relationship 
could be used to make predictions about the likelihood that a given individual has 
been abused much like we might be able to make a prediction about a single coin 
flip. 
  Postdiction at a probabilistic level is theoretically possible if the following 
are known in the population of interest: (1) How many abused children from that 
population exhibit the symptom?, (2) How many non-abused children from that 
same population exhibit the symptom?, and (3) What is the base rate of abuse in 
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Experts across the country have written about the dangers of 
using current symptoms to back-diagnose abuse in children; they  
firmly state that it is not currently possible.75 Indeed, the scholar 
who first developed the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation 
Syndrome (CSAAS)76 has written of the dangers of using CSAAS as 
a diagnostic tool and the inappropriateness of using it as 
postdiction evidence in a legal setting.77 Even those who suggest 
that postdiction is possible severely restrict the circumstances under 
which it would be possible to engage in it and clearly state that only 
a probabilistic statement, rather than a definitive conclusion, might 
be made. 
Detecting false reports: What about using children’s statements 
and the consistency and details of their statements to validate their 
claims? Consistency and details of a child’s report are some of the 
most important criteria used by professionals in evaluating the 
reliability of children’s allegations of abuse,78 and inconsistency in 
young children’s reports lowers their credibility in the eyes of mock 
jurors79 even though some types of inconsistency are normal for 
 
that population? 
  Using the example of sexual play, if 60% of abused children display the 
symptom and 10% of non-abused children play sexually and the base rate of abuse 
is 5%, that leaves us with the following arithmetic for 100 randomly selected 
children. Using the base rates we would expect 5 abused children and 95 non-
abused children. Three of the abused children would play sexually and 9.5 of the 
non-abused children would play sexually. This leaves our predictive power for 
sexualized play at 3:9.5, or we will be right about 25% of the time and wrong 75% 
of the time. 
  Does this change if we have more symptoms? Unfortunately, the answer is 
no. If we have a bed-wetting, hostile child with poor grades who plays sexually with 
dolls, this information is not more predictive. This is because we would expect that 
fewer of the non-abused and abused children will exhibit all of the symptoms. For 
example, only 30% of the non-abused and 5% of the abused might show that 
constellation of symptoms leaving our predictive power for the set of symptoms at 
1.5:5. This time we again would be right about 25% of the time and wrong about 
75% of the time. 
 75. See, e.g., Lucy Berliner & Jon R. Conte, Sexual Abuse Evaluations: Conceptual 
and Empirical Obstacles, 17 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 111 (1993); Faith Hagan et al., 
Assessing the Accuracy of Young Children’s Reports: Lessons from the Investigation of Child 
Sexual Abuse, 7 APPLIED & PREVENTIVE PSYCHOL. 1 (1998); Tamara Penix Sbraga & 
William O’Donohue, Post Hoc Reasoning in Possible Cases of Child Sexual Abuse: 
Symptoms of Inconclusive Origins, 10 CLINICAL PSYCHOL.: SCI. & PRAC. 320 (2003). 
 76. Summit, supra note 63. 
 77. Roland C. Summit, Abuse of the Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 
1 J. CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 153 (1992). 
 78. Jon R. Conte et al., Evaluating Children’s Reports of Sexual Abuse: Results from 
a Survey of Professionals, 61 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 428, 435-36 (1991). 
 79. Michael R. Leippe et al., Eyewitness Persuasion: How and How Well Do Fact 
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accurate statements made by children.80 By combing children’s 
reports for a combination of factors, such as consistency and 
details, statement validity analysis (SVA)81 has some success in 
differentiating between truthful and deceptive reports. However, 
even those who find that SVA distinguishes between children who 
are lying and telling the truth caution that the techniques have 
substantial error rates82 and that factors other than veracity affect 
statement analyses.83 In fact, even in the study that showed the best 
prediction rates of lying and truth-telling in children and adults 
using a combination of verbal and nonverbal indicators, the error 
rates were always higher than 22%. Further, false reporting can be 
caused by deception, but false reporting can also be caused by false 
memories caused by suggestion. There is no evidence that any type 
of statement analysis or other technique can distinguish between 
false memories and true memories.84 
 
Finders Judge the Accuracy of Adults’ and Children’s Memory Reports?, 63 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 181, 193-94 (1992); David F. Ross et al., The Child in the Eyes of the 
Jury: Assessing Mock Jurors’ Perceptions of the Child Witness, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5, 
19 (1990). 
 80. I.e., to contain different pieces of accurate information across interviews. 
See generally Robyn Fivush et al., Content and Consistency in Young Children’s 
Autobiographical Recall, 14 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 373 (1991). 
 81. Readers may be familiar with Content-Based Criteria Analysis (CBCA), 
which is a sub-section of statement validity analysis (SVA). 
 82. Michael E. Lamb, Assessments of Children’s Credibility in Forensic Contexts, 7 
CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 43, 44 (1998). See generally Jaume Masip et al., 
The Detection of Deception with the Reality Monitoring Approach: A Review of the Empirical 
Evidence, 11 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 99 (2005); Aldert Vrij, Criteria-Based Content 
Analysis: A Qualitative Review of the First 37 Studies, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 3 
(2005). 
 83. I.e., children who are younger get lower scores and repeated events get 
higher scores. See Julie A. Buck et al., Age Differences in Criteria-Based Content Analysis 
Scores in Typical Child Sexual Abuse Interviews, 23 J. APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 
267, 279 (2002); Kathy Pezdek et al., Detecting Deception in Children: Event Familiarity 
Affects Criterion-Based Content Analysis Ratings, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 119, 124 
(2004); Aldert Vrij et al., Will the Truth Come Out?: The Effect of Deception, Age, Status, 
Coaching, and Social Skills on CBCA Scores, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261, 274 (2002); 
Aldert Vrij et al., Let Me Inform You How to Tell a Convincing Story: CBCA and Reality 
Monitoring Scores as a Function of Age, Coaching, and Deception, 36 CANADIAN J. 
BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 113, 123 (2004b). 
 84. One study found weak differentiation on CBCA criteria between true and 
false memories, but was never published. Mary Lyn Huffman & Stephen J. Ceci, 
Can Criteria-Based Content Analysis Distinguish True and False Beliefs of Preschoolers? An 
Exploratory Analysis (1997) (unpublished manuscript, as cited in Charles L. Ruby & 
John C. Brigham, The Usefulness of the Criteria-Based Content Analysis Technique in 
Distinguishing Between Truthful and Fabricated Allegations: A Critical Review, 3 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 705, 724-25 (1997)). 
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3.   What the Whole Truth Is 
Clearly, the data presented in this section is slanted towards 
the defense. This is because the current body of data indicates that 
although we may, in some circumstances, be better than chance at 
detecting abuse, lying, and false memories, our ability to detect 
these occurrences does not rise to the level of admissibility as 
probative evidence in a courtroom.85 This is compounded by the 
fact that in some instances prediction levels are worse than chance, 
and we are unable to provide parameters to the court that could 
identify when our judgments are likely to be better than chance or 
worse than chance. This is not to say that we will never be able to 
provide evidence that speaks to the ultimate issue, although we 
have listed some of the obstacles to this goal. However, at this time, 
there is no evidence that abuse can be confidently predicted from 
behaviors or statements. 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND CAVEATS 
This paper provides a substantial review of important research 
and theory in three major areas of research relevant to the 
prosecution and defense of criminal cases involving child witnesses, 
with particular emphasis on child sexual assault cases—namely, 
children’s memory, children’s suggestibility, and the ability to 
diagnose abuse. As is the case with any presentation of social 
science research in a legal setting, it is critically important to 
remind the reader of the limitations of applying the scholarship to 
the legal arena. In particular, we emphasize two caveats. 
First, there is no substitute for expertise. The data presented in 
this review are not exhaustive. Indeed, a review of “all” of the 
psychological literature on child witnesses would require an entire 
book, if not several books. The authors have used their own 
expertise to select themes in the literature and have made attempts 
to highlight the most important issues in a balanced manner. This 
means that many other issues were left out and the reader is 
encouraged to refer to a number of edited books on the topic of 
child witnesses.86 Even within the selected topics, not all 
 
  85. John E.B. Meyers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination, 
Cross-Examination, and Impeachment, 18 PAC. L.J. 801, 840-846 (1987) (discussing 
issues of probity and admissibility of evidence relating to credibility of child 
witnesses).     
 86. See supra note 4. 
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information could be presented. Therefore, there are fine 
distinctions within the selected body of literature, of which the 
authors may well be aware, that were not presented in this review. 
While this review provides a good overview of three areas of 
research related to child witnesses, reading the review will not 
result in the same breadth, depth, and flexibility of knowledge that 
an expert in the field will have attained. 
Second, all descriptions of data in this manuscript are 
probabilistic. This is the nature of social science data. There were 
children in most studies who behaved in opposition to the reported 
trend. A statement such as “by age 2.5 children are capable of long-
lasting memories of salient events” should always be interpreted as 
meaning “on average.” Some 2.6 year olds are not capable of such 
remembering, some 2.4 year olds are capable of such 
remembering, and some events will not be remembered by any 
given child. In addition, many statements reflect differences from a 
control group, and thus these statements may not be true for the 
majority of children. For example, consider the statement 
“children who are pressured report more false events.” This 
statement is made in comparison to a control group and thus 
would be more completely stated as “children who are pressured 
report more false events than children who were not pressured.” As the 
reader can see, it is possible that fewer than 50% of children who 
received pressure reported false events as long as more children 
who received pressure reported false events. Both of these example 
statements are not any less true or informative about human 
behavior because of the variability between people and conditions, 
but for these reasons averages cannot be applied with confidence 
to individuals. 
Because the findings are complex, nuanced, and cannot be 
confidently applied to individual cases, both the courts and the 
expert psychological witnesses may wonder about the utility of 
attempting to use psychological data in what is often an 
acrimonious, and by definition adversarial, criminal justice system. 
What is clear from the work presented on jurors’, lawyers’, and 
judges’ knowledge is that jurors have many misconceptions about 
eyewitnesses, including child witnesses, than expert testimony can 
attempt to clarify. As long as the data are applied appropriately, 
there are many ways in which research in the field of psychology 
and the law has had, and can continue to have, beneficial impacts 
on the prosecution and defense of criminal cases. 
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